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A Partial-Equilibrium Simulation of Increasing the U.S. Tariff-Rate Sugar Quota
for Cuba and Mexico
In 1960, President Eisenhower enacted an economic embargo on Cuba, which is
still in effect today.  However, recent developments in Congress indicate a move toward
cooperation with Cuba.  Such actions include the introduction of the Cuban Humanitarian
Trade Act of 1999, introduced in the House, the Cuban Food and Medicine Security Act
of 1999, introduced in the Senate, as well as the United States-Cuba Trade Act of 2000,
introduced in both the House and Senate.
The possibility of resuming trade with Cuba, along with the increase in trade with
Mexico and Canada due to the NAFTA create an environment of uncertainty in U.S.
markets.  Of major concern is the NAFTA’s influence on U.S. and Mexican sugar
production, demand, and prices.  This concern also holds true for the case of Cuba, the
world’s fifth-largest sugar exporter, and prior to the revolution of 1959, supplier of over
one-third of total sugar requirements to the United States (Alvarez and Castellanos,
1995).  Mexico and the United States underwent difficult negotiations due to the
ambiguous nature of the original NAFTA text and a “side letter” allowing different
quantities of Mexican sugar into the United States.  One controversial issue is whether to
include corn sweeteners when computing Mexico’s net surplus producer status.  Another
is the level of the allocation when Mexico reaches net surplus producer status.  According
to the American Sugar Alliance (2001), for years 2000-2007, Mexico can export up to
250,000 MT of raw or refined sugar to the United States when it is a net surplus
producer.  For fiscal year 2001, however, the USDA announced Mexico’s allocation at
105,788 MT.  Mexico believed it should have complete access for all of its excess, which3
it estimated at over 500,000 MT.  Controversy notwithstanding, after the year 2008,
Mexico will have unlimited access to the U.S. market.
The purpose of this study was to identify the status-quo of the sugar markets of
Cuba, Mexico, and the United States, and then simulate various increases in the current
U.S. tariff-rate quota for sugar, to include Cuba and account for increases in Mexico’s
allocation.  The simulated effects on both domestic and international sugar markets,
including production, consumption, prices, and trade are reported.  Also reported are the
simulated welfare effects for the U.S. sugar market.  This study was carried out using a
partial-equilibrium simplified world trade model, known as Modele Internationale
Simplifié de Simulation (MISS) which simulates, in a comparative-static framework, the
effects of various policy actions.
Overview of the Tariff-Rate Quota
The current U.S. sugar program continues to differ from the grains, rice, and
cotton programs in that the USDA makes no income transfers to beet or cane growers.
Instead, the incomes of producers are indirectly supported by limiting the amount of
imported sugar through import quotas (Jurenas, 1999). The sugar program’s provision of
no net cost to the federal government also brought about the use of the import quota to
support domestic prices and prevent loan forfeitures (Uri and Boyd, 1994).  Quota
allocations are given to quota-holding countries which allow the import of specific
quantities of sugar produced in those nations at a first-tier, or low-tier, duty rate, which
ranges from zero to 0.625 U.S. cents per pound.  Imports above the allocated tariff-rate
quota from either the quota-holding countries or other countries are subject to a second-
tier, or high-tier, duty.  This high-tier duty has historically been high enough to4
discourage the importation of sugar above the low-tier quota (Henneberry and Haley,
1998).
Theoretical Framework
This study utilized the same model as that of Mahé et al.  (1988), Johnson et al.
(1993), and Kennedy et al. (1996).  Consider a market in which N commodities are
produced, consumed, and traded by K countries.  Vectors of supply, demand, and excess
demand are used to describe aggregate levels of production, consumption, and trade in
each country.  The supply sector in country k produces some combination of the N
commodities in order to maximize producer rents, given prices, technology, and
endowments.  Aggregate production of the N commodities is described by the vector of
supply functions:

























Nk) is the vector of prices observed by the supply sector and
Z
S
k is a vector of exogenous variables, such as technology, input prices, and endowments
for the supply sector of country k.  The vector of demand functions describes aggregate


























Nk) is the vector of prices observed by the final demand
sector and Z
D
k is a vector of exogenous variables for country k.  The aggregate level of


















where Mk = (M1k, M2k, …, MNk) and Mik > 0 indicates net imports and Mik < 0 indicates
net exports of commodity i  for i = 1, 2, …, N.5
The government of a country may intervene in the domestic market either through
the use of price (p) or supply/demand shift (q) instruments.  A price instrument, denoted
as A
pS
ik for producers and A
pD
ik for consumers of commodity i in country k affect the
prices observed by the supply and final demand sectors.  With the world price of
commodity i represented as P
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for i = 1, 2, …, N.
Supply/demand shift instruments, denoted as A
qS
ik for producers and A
qD
ik for





supply and demand functions by modifying non-price elements of a producer’s or
consumer’s decision-making process.  Examples include input subsidies, acreage























The aggregate supply, demand, and excess demand equations, (1), (2), and (3),
respectively, can be expressed as functions of world price, policy instruments, and
exogenous variables by substituting the domestic price functions (4) and the function of





























































W)] for j = S, D.6
World markets are competitive by assumption, and world prices adjust to clear
world markets.  Therefore:
(6) S
K



















where the right-hand side of (6) is an n x 1 null vector.  World prices are defined as

















for k = 1, 2, …, K.
Empirical Analysis
The empirical results were calculated using Modèle Internationale Simplifié de
Simulation (MISS), developed by Mahé et al.  (1988).  MISS is a multi-product, multi-
regional, non-spatial, partial-equilibrium, world trade model, which simulates, in a
comparative-static framework, the effects of various policy actions.  Mahé et al.  (1988)
used MISS for an analysis of the interaction between European and United States policies.
That model consisted of seven commodities and four regions: the European Union, the
United States, a market-based rest of the world, and a centrally planned rest of the world.
Kennedy et al. (1996) utilized MISS to study policy decisions made during the Uruguay
Round of GATT negotiations.  Their model consisted of seven commodities and three
sectors: the European Union, the United States, and the rest of the world.  Kennedy and
Hughes (1998) used MISS to analyze welfare effects of agricultural trading blocs, by
simulating a North American customs union.
The present model consisted of four regions: Cuba, Mexico, the United States,
and an aggregated “Rest of the World” (hereafter referred to as ROW).  In order to create7
a framework in which cane sugar and beet sugar were perfect substitutes, only one
commodity was specified within the model: refined sugar.  By expressing beet and cane
production in terms of sugar produced rather than beet or cane produced, the levels of
supply could be directly compared to the levels of demand.  Thus, the model assumes that
sugar is produced by the farmer and sold directly to the consumer.  However, to capture
supply response differences between beet and cane production, two distinct production
sectors were specified in each region, sugarbeet producers and sugarcane producers, that
produce the same commodity.  Of course, since Cuba and Mexico produce sugar from
sugarcane only, their respective levels of sugarbeet production were zero.  One demand
sector was specified, representing aggregate consumption of sugar by both industrial and
non-industrial users.  Since only one commodity was specified within the model, only
one price was specified as well.  This model made use of the London Daily Price for
refined sugar reported by USDA as the world refined sugar price.  To model domestic
price departure from world prices, protection coefficients were specified for each region.
In the case of the United States, this coefficient was based on the U.S. wholesale refined
beet sugar price, Midwest Markets, reported by Milling & Baking News and listed in the
USDA ERS Sugar and Sweetener Situation and Outlook Reports (hereafter referred to as
SSR).  Since the United States utilizes an import quota to support domestic prices, initial
protection coefficients for supply and demand were equal.  This was also true of Mexico,
which, from the year 2000 forward, is required under the NAFTA to implement a similar
import control system.  Mexico’s protection coefficient was based on refined sugar prices
reported in the USDA FAS GAIN Reports (hereafter referred to as FAS).  Cuba was
assumed to respond to the world market price, and thus, had a protection coefficient of8
one.  For simplicity, transportation costs were assumed to be zero; therefore, each region
had a margin coefficient of one.  MISS does not specify beginning and ending stocks for
each region.  Rather, a general ‘world stocks’ was specified, which accounts for world
excess supply/demand in order to balance the model.
Table 1 contains production, supply, and distribution data for Cuba, Mexico, the
United States, and the ROW, reported in SSR.  For fiscal year 1999, average wholesale
refined sugar prices were 22.87, 27.02, and 9.81 cents per pound for Mexico, the United
States, and the world, respectively (SSR, 2000).
Table 1.  Production, Supply, and Distribution of Sugar, FY 1999, in 1,000 MTRV.
Production, Supply, and Distribution of Sugar, FY 1999 (1,000 MTRV)
Beginning





United States 1,523 7,597 1,655 209 9,079 1,487
Beet 4,013
Cane 3,584
Mexico 670 4,985 0 590 4,400 665
Cuba 290 3,780 0 3,200 720 150
ROW * 23,309 114,307 34,265 31,921 110,158 28,341
Beet  ** 28,310
Cane ** 85,997
Total 25,792 130,669 35,920 35,920 124,357 30,643
All figures rounded to the nearest whole number
* Calculated by subtracting US, Mexico, and Cuba from World Totals.
Source:  USDA Sugar and Sweetener S&O/SSS-228/May 2000
             ** Taken from various FAS GAIN Reports.
The elasticities used in the empirical model were taken from various sources and
adjusted to fit the present model.  For brevity, only the final own-price supply and
demand elasticities used in the simulation are reported in Table 2.  The reader is referred
to Petrolia (2001) for specific sources and modifications of elasticity estimates.  The
“supply” side is conceived to be composed of growers, cane refiners, and processors,
while those of the demand side are households and users of refined sugar as an input,9
such as bakers, confectioners, and beverage producers.  The United States has both a
short- and long-run elasticity of demand.  While it is possible that consumer preferences
for sugar may change over time, this difference is intended to represent, for example, a
beverage producer’s ability to switch to lower-cost sweeteners, such as HFCS, in the long
run.  We may conceive of land and capital being fixed in the short run, with all inputs
being variable in the long run.  Also, note that cane supply is more inelastic than that of
beet, primarily because cane production is limited by local refining capacity.  Since sugar
beets do not experience a “refining” stage, beet growers do not have this limitation.
Sugar beets and sugarcane do not compete for land, thus cross-price elasticities of supply
were assumed to be zero.  Also, since sugar was the only commodity within the model,
there were no cross-price elasticities of demand.  Note that simulations were undertaken
using both “short-run” and “long-run” elasticities.  The authors recognize that it is most
difficult to conceive of a static model in the long run, and that short-run elasticites are the
only appropriate elasticities for this type of model.  However, the authors also believe
that the short- and long-run elasticities may be more appropriately viewed as lower and
upper bounds on elastities, giving the results a sort of “confidence interval”.
Table 2.  Own-price supply and demand elasticities used in MISS.
Own-Price Supply and Demand Elasticities Used in MISS
Short-Run Elasticities Long-Run Elasticities
Supply
  US Mexico Cuba ROW US Mexico Cuba ROW
Beet 0.34 - - 0.10 0.86 - - 0.43
Cane 0.14 0.18 0.13 0.23 0.40 0.67 0.68 0.62
Demand
  US Mexico Cuba ROW US Mexico Cuba ROW
Sugar -0.14 -0.73 -1.40 -0.64 -0.50 -0.73 -1.40 -0.6410
Trade Liberalization Scenarios
Four trade liberalization scenarios, summarized in Table 3, were developed in
which the United States import quota was gradually increased relative to the base year.
These scenarios were carried out to simulate increased imports of sugar to the United
States from both Mexico and Cuba.  The base represented the status-quo prior to 1994,
when Mexico’s quota allocation was 25,000 MT.  Scenario 1 simulated Mexican
accession into the U.S. market of 250,000 MTRV of refined sugar, analogous to the
NAFTA agreement for the years 2000-2007.  Scenario 2 simply allocated to Cuba an
allocation of 250,000 along with Mexico.  Scenarios 3 and 4 gave Cuba and Mexico an
Table 3.  Scenarios simulated in MISS.
Scenarios Simulated in MISS
U.S. Import Quantity Allocated (MT) Scenario
Cuba Mexico Total
Base 0 25,000 25,000
1 0 250,000 250,000
2 250,000 250,000 500,000
3 500,000 500,000 1,000,000
4 750,000 750,000 1,500,000
allocation of 500,000, and 750,000 MTRV each, respectively.  These scenarios
simulated, under hypothetical import levels, the free-trade regime stipulated under the
NAFTA that will be in force after 2008, with the addition that Cuba was also given
similar access.
Results
Table 4 indicates, in the short run, that giving Mexico its allocation of 250,000
MT will drive the U.S. price down to 25.1 cents per pound, still well above the loan rate
for beets of 22.9 cents.  These results show that an allocation of 1 million MT of sugar
between Cuba and Mexico (Scenario 3) would be necessary to drive the domestic price11
below 20 cents per pound.  It is difficult to compare these results to the real world, since
Mexico has not yet reached an export level of 250,000 MT, and yet the average
wholesale beet sugar price for fiscal year 2000 was 21.9 cents (triggering the loan rate).
Evidently, other economic factors are at work, and perhaps such allocations as those
simulated here would result in even greater price reductions.  Note, however, that with
long-run elasticities, even in Scenario 4, the refined price stays just above 20 cents per
pound, indicating that a more elastic sugar market would sustain higher prices as imports
increased.
The results further indicate that given increased imports by the United States, the
world price would remain largely unaffected, seeing, at most, a 1.6% increase.  This adds
doubt to the argument that as the United States liberalizes trade, exporters will have less
of an incentive to export because the world price would rise dramatically, lessening the
Table 4.  Refined sugar price changes relative to the base, 1,000 MTRV.
Refined Sugar Price Changes Relative to the Base (1,000 MTRV)
United States Refined Sugar Price
Short-Run Elasticities Long-Run Elasticities
Scenario
Cents/lb. $/MT % Change Cents/lb. $/MT % Change
Base 26.98 594.58 26.98 594.58
1 25.10 553.19 -6.96% 26.00 572.99 -3.63%
2 23.15 510.27 -14.18% 24.93 549.45 -7.59%
3 19.67 433.39 -27.11% 22.86 503.84 -15.26%
4 16.66 367.15 -38.25% 20.88 460.14 -22.61%
World Refined Sugar Price
Short-Run Elasticities Long-Run Elasticities
Scenario
Cents/lb. $/MT % Change Cents/lb. $/MT % Change
Base 9.81 216.21 9.81 216.21
1 9.83 216.73 0.24% 9.83 216.55 0.16%
2 9.86 217.29 0.50% 9.84 216.95 0.34%
3 9.91 218.46 1.04% 9.88 217.73 0.70%
4 9.96 219.62 1.58% 9.91 218.51 1.06%12
gap between domestic and world prices.  On the contrary, the world price remains
relatively low, and unless the domestic price is allowed to equal world levels, the
incentive to export to the United States will remain intact.
Table 5 indicates that in the short run, when Mexico is given an allocation of
250,000 MT, beet sugar production falls only 2.42%, from 4.013 million MT to 3.916
million MT, while cane sugar decreases only 1%, from 3.584 million MT to 3.548
million MT.  Also demand rises slightly from 9.079 million MT to 9.171 million MT, a
rise of 1.02%.  Hence, results indicate that the affect of the NAFTA agreement for years
2000-2007 should be minimal with regard to production and consumption.  Note that
long-run results are somewhat greater for production, but still relatively small.  However,
Table 5.  U.S. supply and demand changes relative to the base, in 1,000 MTRV.




% Change Cane Supply % Change Demand % Change
Base 4013.00 3584.00 9079.00
1 3915.89 -2.42% 3548.16 -1.00% 9171.61 1.02%
2 3809.54 -5.07% 3508.02 -2.12% 9275.11 2.16%
3 3604.08 -10.19% 3428.81 -4.33% 9490.28 4.53%




% Change Cane Supply % Change Demand % Change
Base 4013.00 3584.00 9079.00
1 3887.39 -3.13% 3531.32 -1.47% 9126.21 0.52%
2 3749.75 -6.56% 3472.54 -3.11% 9179.78 1.11%
3 3480.47 -13.27% 3354.27 -6.41% 9292.36 2.35%
4 3219.23 -19.78% 3234.92 -9.74% 9410.38 3.65%13
as this allocation is extended to Cuba (Scenario 2), and as both Cuba and Mexico export
more sugar to the U.S. (Scenarios 3 and 4), results indicate that beet sugar supply would
see significant decreases, about 15% in the most extreme case, whereas cane sees a more
modest reduction of 6.5%.  Demand rises from 2% to 4% to 6%, respectively, in the latter
three scenarios.  Again, and as expected, long-run elasticites give somewhat larger
changes in production.
Table 6 indicates that Cuba sees little change in supply and demand as a result of
being given access to the U.S. market.  Even in the most liberalized scenario, Cuba’s
production increases only 7,000 MT, a change of 0.2%, while demand falls 2.17%.
Therefore, results indicate that market access for Cuba, in itself, will not significantly
affect the Cuban sugar market.
Table 6.  Cuban supply and demand changes relative to the base, 1,000  MTRV.
Cuban Supply and Demand Changes Relative to the Base (1,000 MT)
Using Short-Run Elasticities
Scenario Cane Supply % Change Demand % Change
Base 3780.00 720
1 3781.13 0.03% 717.55 -0.34%
2 3782.27 0.06% 714.96 -0.70%
3 3784.91 0.13% 709.63 -1.44%
4 3787.56 0.20% 704.38 -2.17%
Using Long-Run Elasticities
Scenario Cane Supply % Change Demand % Change
Base 3780.00 720.00
1 3784.16 0.11% 718.42 -0.22%
2 3788.69 0.23% 716.62 -0.47%
3 3798.14 0.48% 713.02 -0.97%
4 3807.22 0.72% 709.42 -1.47%14
Since no policy changes were simulated for Mexico, and since Mexico’s domestic
price was protected from the world market, they experienced no production or
consumption changes throughout all simulations.  Mexico’s increase in imports to the
United States is a case of trade diversion, rather than trade creation.  Or perhaps, this
should be viewed as the removal of trade diversion resulting from the initial U.S. policy.
Welfare Effects
It is generally accepted that liberalized trade in sugar would result in gains to
consumers and losses to producers in the U.S. sugar market.  Nevertheless, a calculation
of domestic welfare effects is included here to give an approximation of the degree of
such effects.  Before reporting the results, however, the authors would like to make
known a few caveats.  First, recall that Marshallian and Hicksian welfare measures are
identical in the presence of zero income effect.  Since sugar likely composes only a
miniscule part of the typical American consumer’s budget, the assumption that the
income effect is zero is not heroic.  The same can be said of the production side, if, as
Mishan (1968) writes, “So long as firms are explicit profit maximizers, they are
uninfluenced by welfare effects and no such distinction need therefore be maintained for
producer’s surplus.”  Marshallian and Hicksian measures are, again, identical.  Second,
recall the discussion earlier on the use of short- and long-run elasticities in a static model.
Quoting Mishan again, “[I]n the long period at least, the area above the supply curve is
not an unambiguous index of gain to any person or group in the economy.”  Recognizing
this, “long-run” welfare results are given along with “shor-run” results to construct a sort
of “confidence interval”, but encourages the reader to focus on short-run results.  Third,
there exists a problem in interpreting producer gains and losses.  In this simplified model,15
there is only one “producer”, but in reality there are growers, refiners, processors, etc.,
each of whom may gain or lose given particular policy changes.  For example, imports of
raw sugar are in direct competition with the product of sugarcane growers, yet increases
in raw sugar translate into greater demand for the services of a refinery.  On the other
hand, imports of refined sugar would be in direct competition with the product of grower
and refiner alike.  However, to give some indication of the overall impact of policy
changes, the estimated welfare effects can be considered a “net” effect on the production
side.  Last, only one price, the wholesale beet price, was used to represent the U.S.
market.  However, the domestic raw cane price is typically a few cents per pound less
than the wholesale price, and thus, losses in producer rent may be somewhat overstated.
Conversely, a significant portion of sugar is bought at the retail price, which is typically
12-16 cents per pound greater than the wholesale price.  Hence, estimated consumer
gains due to trade liberalization may be too conservative.
Table 7 shows, using short-run elasticities, that as imports progressively increase
from Scenario 1 to 4, consumer surplus increases relative to the base, from $377.7
million to $2.137 billion, respectively.  Producer quasi-rent decreases relative to the base,
ranging from $312 million to $1.632 billion.  As expected, there is a net welfare gain for
all scenarios, ranging from $66 million in Scenario 1 to $504.7 million in Scenario 8.  In
short, any move toward liberalization results in losses of producer quasi-rent, consumer
surplus gains, and a net welfare gain for the economy.16
Table 7.  U.S. changes in consumer surplus and producer quasi-rent, and net welfare gains.
United States Changes in Consumer Surplus and Producer Quasi-rent and Net Welfare Gains
Using Short-Run Elasticities




Consumer Producer Net Gain
Base 4,013,000 3,584,000 9,079,000 594.58
1 3,915,890 3,548,160 9,171,610 553.19 $377,696,374 -$311,688,430 $66,007,944
2 3,809,540 3,508,020 9,275,110 510.27 $773,717,507 -$628,723,277 $144,994,230
3 3,604,080 3,428,810 9,490,280 433.39 $1,496,591,122 -$1,179,095,985 $317,495,137
4 3,406,230 3,349,960 9,712,710 367.15 $2,136,899,303 -$1,632,173,001 $504,726,302
Using Long-Run Elasticities




Consumer Producer Net Gain
Base 4,013,000 3,584,000 9,079,000 594.58
1 3,887,390 3,531,320 9,126,210 572.99 $196,525,242 -$162,094,589 $34,430,653
2 3,749,750 3,472,540 9,179,780 549.45 $412,009,371 -$334,397,279 $77,612,092
3 3,480,470 3,354,270 9,292,360 503.84 $833,508,603 -$654,768,044 $178,740,559
4 3,219,230 3,234,920 9,410,380 460.14 $1,242,856,124 -$944,518,303 $298,337,821
Conclusions
This study illustrates the economic gains possible through liberalization of sugar
trade.  However, while the use of a partial-equilibrium framework allows for an adequate
analysis of the sugar market, it ignores gains and losses outside of the sugar market.  For
example, communities and businesses dependent on domestic sugar production could be
significantly affected due to such changes in supply.
Also, the results of this model follow from the assumption that the world market
is large and that members of that market respond to world prices.  This may not be the
case, however, as many nations either protect domestic markets or have long-term
agreements with others to trade specified amounts of sugar regardless of market
conditions.  If this was the case, the ROW sector would be composed of two parts:  one
that responds to world prices, and one that does not, where the price-responsive part17
could be considered as a “dump” market.  Obviously, this specification would make the
world market more responsive to changes in U.S. import policies, resulting in greater
price fluctuations.
Another issue is that domestic sugar prices, if sufficiently depressed, could lead to
increased loan forfeitures, which also means increased government spending, both on the
loans and on storage for the forfeited sugar.  Recall that the average wholesale beet sugar
price for fiscal year 2000 was below the loan-rate trigger level, and during that period,
Mexico’s imports did not even exceed 150,000 MT (SSR 2001).   Of equal concern is the
increased price volatility and uncertainty that would be introduced as a result of increased
trade liberalization.
As tariffs on Mexican sugar imports fall, there will be greater incentive for
Mexico to send its surplus to the United States.  As the NAFTA stipulates, TRQs for
other countries will be cut, if necessary, to offset imports of Mexican sugar.  What this
means in terms of trade relations with the rest of the world remains to be seen.  However,
it can be expected that those countries whose sugar is displaced by that of Mexico will
seek some type of reconciliation, be it countervailing duties imposed on the United States
or some future negotiations allowing more foreign sugar into the United States.  Also, the
very use of the TRQ as a quantitative limit to imports will come under severe pressure as
trade barriers are lowered and eventually dissolved for Mexico.  In the extreme case, only
Mexican sugar would be imported into the United States, with all other TRQs being
cancelled.  In addition, after the transition period, Mexican sugar will be free to flow into
the domestic market at will.  Hence, U.S. sugar policy may very well become ineffective
as a means of supporting prices through import quotas.18
With regard to Cuba, any move toward trade would certainly aid in restoring
economic stability to the island.  Although results indicate that resuming trade with Cuba
would have little effect on their market, since sugar is a major player in the Cuban
economy, allowing them a fraction of total U.S. sugar imports, at U.S. prices, would give
their sugar industry an immediate boost.  This could lead to increased investment by both
domestic and foreign sources, and improved production and refining capacity.  It is likely
that such investments in Cuban sugar infrastructure would also translate into gains for
U.S. equipment, fertilizer, and seed firms.
While this study makes evident the specific gains from liberalizing sugar trade, it
alludes to a broader and more critical issue.  While strong opposition remains with regard
to resuming trade with Cuba, the United States must be mindful not to allow itself to be a
victim of its own policies.  While the objective of the embargo is to limit Cuba
economically, other countries, are not following suit, but are beginning to invest in Cuba.
With Cuba in such close proximity to the United States and with so many opportunities
for investment and development, the United States should seriously consider its political
objectives with respect to the island and weigh these against its long-term economic
objectives.  With sugar being such a major player in the Cuban economy, it may serve as
the easiest means for the United States to reacquaint itself with the island, and get a
foothold in the development boom that is likely to transpire in a post-Castro Cuba.19
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